To the Victors Belong the Spoils: How the United States and Cuban Elites Undermined the Ideals of the Raceles Nation and Cuba Libre (1898-1913) by Pujol Lopez, Daylin
McNair Scholars Journal
Volume 20 | Issue 1 Article 10
2016
To the Victors Belong the Spoils: How the United
States and Cuban Elites Undermined the Ideals of
the Raceles Nation and Cuba Libre (1898-1913)
Daylin Pujol Lopez
Grand Valley State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/mcnair
Copyright © 2016 by the authors. McNair Scholars Journal is reproduced electronically by ScholarWorks@GVSU. https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/
mcnair?utm_source=scholarworks.gvsu.edu%2Fmcnair%2Fvol20%2Fiss1%2F10&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages
Recommended Citation
Pujol Lopez, Daylin (2016) "To the Victors Belong the Spoils: How the United States and Cuban Elites Undermined the Ideals of the
Raceles Nation and Cuba Libre (1898-1913)," McNair Scholars Journal: Vol. 20 : Iss. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/mcnair/vol20/iss1/10
23
Volume 20, 2016
To the Victors Belong the Spoils: How the United States and Cuban Elites 
Undermined the Ideals of the Raceles Nation and Cuba Libre (1898-1913)
Daylin Pujol Lopez
McNair Scholar
David Stark
Faculty Mentor
In Cuba there is no fear of a war of 
races. Man is more than white, more 
than mulatto, more than Negro. On the 
battlefields of Cuba, white and blacks 
have died and their souls risen together 
to heaven. In the daily life of defense, of 
loyalty, of brotherhood, of cunning, besides 
each white man, there was always a Negro.
- José Martí, “My Race.”
Writing in 1893, José Martí described 
Cuba as a raceless nation, devoid of racial 
prejudices or racial tensions. Martí asserted 
that Cubans had overcome their racial 
differences, joining together to fight a 
common enemy. He adopted the ideals of 
the raceless nation, rejected Spanish rule 
and associated colonialism with slavery, 
adopting the ideals of (free Cuba) in an 
effort to combat the disunity that had 
divided insurgents in the Ten Years’ War 
(1868-1878), and the Guerra Chiquita or 
Little War (1879-80).1 The ideals of Cuba 
Libre also figured prominently in Marti’s 
vision for the nation; one in which Cuba 
was free from Spanish rule, dependence 
upon United States economic interests, and 
the dominance of the planter class.
Support for Cuba Libre emerged prior 
to the Second War of Independence 
(1895-1898) as a reaction to Spain’s 
manipulation of racial fears to undermine 
prior independence movements. The 
raceless nation signified different things to 
diverse sectors of Cuban society. Varying 
imaginings of what Cuban meant emerged, 
all justified by the rhetoric of Martí’s 
raceless nation.2 Insurgent victory appeared 
certain in 1898 despite rebels’ revolutionary 
post-independence vision. The United 
States, alarmed at the prospect of losing 
Cuba to the insurgents, intervened in 
1898, frustrating the Cuban independence 
movement once again.
The racial rhetoric that unfolded during the 
liberation movements was distinct from the 
racial ideas held by the intervention forces.3 
Cuban intellectuals attempted to overcome 
racial intolerance whereas in the U.S. the 
“color line” became more rigid.4 Jim Crow 
Laws prevailed in the U.S at the same time 
Martí claimed that “In Cuba there is no 
fear of a war of races” and that a “man has 
no particular rights because he happens 
to belong to a particular race.”5 Racial 
classification in Cuba also differed from 
racial categorization in the United States. A 
two-tier racial system existed in Cuba, where 
blacks, mulattos and whites were separated 
by visible characteristics, instead of the 
one-drop rule that existed in the U.S.6 Thus, 
in Cuba race was a fluid concept, whereas 
in the U.S. race was a binary construct 
and an individual was categorized either as 
“black” or white. How did the occupation 
of Cuba by a nation whose rigid color ideals 
encouraged racial segregation impact the 
emerging social unity and raceless rhetoric in 
the island? My research examines the impact 
of the U.S. occupation (1898-1902) on 
ideas of patria (motherland) and Cubanidad, 
(what it meant to be Cuban) by analyzing 
how notions of race in Cuba changed 
during the U.S. occupation and intervention 
(1906-1909). This study is guided by three 
questions: how did the U.S. occupation 
inform notions of race and nationhood; how 
did the U.S. imperialist ideas shape what it 
meant to be Cuban; and did the American 
racial rhetoric result in increased repression 
of Afro-Cubans and contribute to the racial 
backlash of the 1912 Race War? 
Cuban sovereignty depended upon the 
nation’s ability to prove itself civilized 
and capable of protecting foreign 
property. However, the American Military 
Government (administering the island 
from 1898-1902) viewed most Cubans, 
particularly Afro-Cubans, as backward and 
promoted white interests. This allowed 
white Cuban elites to utilize the U.S. 
occupation and intervention in pursuit 
of their particular vision of Cubanidad 
in which they would occupy positions 
of power. They adopted American 
racial rhetoric to justify their notions 
of Cubanidad, which ensured the social 
hierarchy remained intact, undermining 
the ideals of the raceless nation. Cuban 
elites opposed all manifestations of the 
raceless nation and suppressed “barbaric” 
traditions (Afro-Cuban cultural practices), 
while seeking American support for their 
vision of modernity. The exclusion of Afro-
Cubans from positions of power during 
the initial years following independence 
lead to armed protest in 1912. In turn, the 
1912 Race War was met with repression 
and violence from the Cuban army as the 
U.S. stood by and did nothing. American 
approval of white Cuban elites’ actions 
further marginalized Afro-Cubans who 
were denied access to positions of power in 
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order to demonstrate that the nation was 
capable of governing itself. The exclusion 
of Afro-Cubans served two purposes; it 
prevented lower class Cubans from coming 
to power and it protected the planter 
class, which Cuba Libre was intent on 
destroying. Elite attempts at excluding 
blacks were derived from the fear that if 
the lower classes came to power they would 
implement Marti’s vision of Cuba Libre, 
which threatened the survival of the planter 
class as well as U.S. interests. Therefore, 
Cuba Libre simultaneously threatened the 
planter class and the United States.  
The Independence Movements 
The Ten Years’ War was led by a small 
group of eastern creoles who, frustrated at 
the lack of Spanish political and economic 
reforms, invited their slaves to join them in 
seeking political independence.7 The Grito 
de Yara, proclaimed by Carlos Manuel de 
Céspedes, liberated slaves and invited them 
to “conquer liberty and independence for 
Cuba.”8 A manifesto from October 10, 
1868 suggests that insurgent leaders did 
not support abolition in the early phases of 
the war. Rather, the manifesto declared that 
all men were equal, but did not incorporate 
abolition into the formal objectives of 
the movement.9 Such contradictions were 
attributed to the need to attract the support 
of Afro-Cubans, who were crucial for the 
war, and slaveholders, whose support was 
essential to fund the insurgency.10 The 
abolition policy adopted by white leaders 
was limited, albeit it “rai[sed] the issue of 
the social question and arou[sed] with their 
conduct the spirit of people of color.”11 
Economic and political dissatisfaction was 
manifested differently in the eastern and 
western regions of the island. There was 
greater variety in the agricultural economy 
in the east, with sugar estates existing 
alongside tobacco and coffee farms.12 
Planters cultivated smaller plots of land, 
relied less upon slave labor, and were more 
likely to be affected by fluctuations in the 
economy than their counterparts in western 
Cuba. Consequently, there was greater 
support for the insurgency in eastern 
Cuba. Expansion in the nineteenth century 
promoted the growth of the sugar industry 
and ingenios (sugar mills) expanded across 
the western provinces.13 There was greater 
fear of black rebellion in the west because 
planters’ livelihoods were tied to slave labor. 
A large portion of the plantation workforce 
in the western provinces was comprised 
of slaves and planters feared a slave revolt. 
This resulted in stronger ties to the colonial 
regime and less inclination to support the 
insurgency. 
Afro-Cubans embraced the insurgency 
and some like Antonio Maceo emerged as 
leaders in the independence movement. In 
doing so, they began to view the movement 
differently - as one not just to achieve 
independence, but also to abolish slavery. 
The Spanish government called attention 
to the prominence of black leaders as proof 
that an independent Cuba would become 
another black republic, like Haiti. Afro-
Cuban participation in the Liberation Army 
increased, augmenting white fears of a 
black movement that threatened the social 
order of Cuba.14 For these reasons, Afro-
Cuban leaders like Maceo were suspected of 
attempting to create a black republic when 
he requested 500 men to invade the western 
region of the island. The invasion never 
occurred because insurgent leaders feared 
that Cuba would “share the fate of Haiti 
and Santo Domingo.”15 Thus, racial fear 
confined the independence movement to the 
eastern region of the island.
Tension amongst insurgents, low morale 
after years of fighting, economic hardships 
and white fear of Afro-Cuban participation 
in the insurgency further fractured the 
liberation movement. On February 
8, 1877, rebel leaders accepted the 
conditions of the Pact of Zanjón. However, 
insurgents, many of them Afro-Cuban, 
continued to fight for Cuba Libre in the 
eastern provinces under the leadership 
of Antonio Maceo, who denounced the 
committee’s actions as “shameful,” and 
refused to acknowledge the pact without 
independence and the abolition for all 
slaves.16 Afro-Cubans continued to wage 
war against the Spanish until May, when 
Maceo surrendered and left the island – the 
Ten Years’ War finally came to an end.  
Peace on the island was disrupted once 
again on August 24, 1879, when dissatisfied 
patriots from the Ten Years’ War led a 
new independence movement, the Guerra 
Chiquita or the Little War. It appealed to 
slaves who had not taken up arms in the Ten 
Years’ War and who viewed independence 
as a means to abolish slavery.17 Afro-Cubans 
constituted a large proportion of the rebel 
forces since many “former insurgents and 
slaves” joined the new movement, making 
the new insurgency “blacker” than the first.18 
At the same time, many white separatists 
from the first war condemned the new 
rebellion, declaring that they opposed any 
“threat to liberty.”19 Because it attracted 
such a large proportion of Afro-Cubans, the 
Guerra Chiquita lacked the support of many 
white veterans who had fought in the Ten 
Years’ War.
Spain utilized the insurgents’ “blackness” 
to argue that the movement’s goals were 
not to create a sovereign nation but to 
transform Cuba into a black republic - one 
whose very existence threatened Cuban 
society.20 These fears played a part in the 
movement’s leader Calixto Garcia’s decision 
to appoint a white leader instead of Maceo, 
who had previously led the rebel forces in 
Oriente province. The appointment of a 
white leader was a way not to “give credit 
to [Spanish] assumptions” that it was a race 
war.21 Nonetheless, the Spanish government 
sought to shape the composition of 
the rebellion by “remo[ving] the white 
element” from the rebellion and pressuring 
white leaders to surrender.22 In this way, 
the insurgency became more black and 
Spanish claims appeared more plausible.23 
Spanish propaganda divided insurgents 
by highlighting the fragmentation of the 
rebellion, and manipulated racial fears 
by depicting Afro-Cuban rebels as “men 
exempt from any sense of honor and 
humanity.”24 Afro-Cuban rebels were 
portrayed as criminals and murderers 
seeking to massacre whites and rape 
women.25 Such claims brought racial fears 
to the forefront and prompted whites to 
reject the insurgency precisely because it 
was predominantly black. 
 
Figure 1
(Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y 
Deporte) 26
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To achieve political independence Cuba 
had to address the racial tensions that 
had divided her during the preceding 
independence movements. For this 
reason, the rhetoric of the raceless nation 
targeted the stereotypical depictions 
of Afro-Cubans used to create panic 
amongst white Cubans. For example, 
Spanish newspapers portrayed the typical 
insurgents as apes (Figure 1), suggesting 
that rebels were predominately black as 
well as primitive and uncivilized. These 
depictions of Afro-Cubans during the 
Ten Years’ War exploited white fears of 
a race war, discouraging whites from 
joining the insurgency. In this way, the 
struggle for independence evoked the 
threat of Cuba becoming a black nation. 
A successful independence movement 
needed to refute claims of racial strife and 
articulate a new rhetoric that unified the 
island by advocating for the inclusion of 
all Cubans. Intellectuals, among them José 
Martí, emphasized that blacks were not a 
racial threat because they were “grateful 
recipients of white generosity.”27 The new 
rhetoric asserted that whites had redeemed 
themselves for enslaving blacks and that 
Afro-Cubans had overcome the legacy of 
this enslavement because “racial equality 
[was] the foundation of the new Cuban 
nation.”28 Claims such as “I am white, 
but before that…I am a Cuban who loves 
la patria [the motherland]” appeared in 
the Cuban newspaper La Prensa.29 The 
rhetoric of the raceless nation argued that 
racial identity was not a crucial component 
of Cubanidad.30 Rather, to highlight a 
particular racial group was unpatriotic 
because, according to José Martí, to be 
Cuban meant being “more than white, 
more than mulatto, more than Negro.”31
Not only did Martí affirm that Cuba was 
a raceless nation, but he also articulated 
a vision for an independent Cuba, one in 
which Cuba would be free from Spanish 
political control and the United States’ 
economic influence as well as free from 
racial discrimination. Martí’s vision of a 
Cuba Libre united black and white Cubans 
against a common Spanish enemy. Cuba 
Libre came to mean not just independence, 
but also social justice and as well as a 
“means of redemption.”33 In this way, 
independence was described as “breaking 
the colonial chains” (Figure 2). The new 
rhetoric implied that Afro-Cubans had 
been oppressed in the same manner that 
the Cuban nation was subjugated to Spain. 
Political freedom meant both political 
liberty and an end to racial discrimination 
for all Cubans. The promise of freedom
 
Figure 2
(University of Miami Library) 32
appealed to blacks and many of the popular 
classes who joined the movement in the 
hopes of achieving these goals. Unity 
would be paramount in the Second War of 
Independence, which began on February 
24, 1895. Its success hinged upon a 
successful island wide revolt. In the east, 
the insurrection quickly spread, meanwhile 
rebels targeted the western provinces where 
the previous revolts had failed.34 By 1896, 
the Liberation Army advanced on Havana 
and threatened the survival of the planter 
class. The support from different sectors of 
Cuban society strengthened the nationalist 
movement allowing the Liberation Army to 
take control over much of the island.35 By 
spring 1898, the rebels were on the verge 
of victory. 
The United States Intervention 
With victory in sight, the ideals of Cuba 
Libre loomed in the horizon. Aware that 
Spain was “too feeble to hold them,” as an 
editorial cartoon in the The Washington Post 
declared in 1896, and not willing to allow 
the island to become sovereign, President 
William McKinley began negotiations with 
Spain to acquire the island.36 However, 
Spain had no intention of transferring 
Cuba to the United States and it soon 
became clear that the island was in danger 
of falling into Afro-Cuban hands. There 
were two options: U.S. intervention or 
Cuban independence.37
A free Cuba challenged American 
economic and political interests; therefore, 
the U.S. administration sought ways to 
stall the Cuban triumph. According to U.S 
officials, “Cuba was far too important to 
be turned over to the Cubans.”38 In March 
1898, the U.S. minister to Spain declared 
that the insurgency was “confined almost 
entirely of negroes,” then warned that 
Cuban independence would result in a 
“second Santo Domingo.”39 In April 1898, 
President McKinley requested permission 
from Congress to intervene  and stop 
hostilities between Spain and Cuba.40 The 
United States went to war in May and by 
December 1898, Spain had surrendered 
to the United States after ceding Cuba to 
U.S. troops. 
The image of the Cuban rebel and of 
Cubans changed after the intervention, 
from the valiant oppressed insurgent 
to one “absolutely devoid of honor or 
gratitude.”41 Before the intervention, 
newspapers and magazines in the 
U.S. portrayed Cuban insurgents as 
(typically white) heroes fighting against 
an oppressive Spain.42 In 1898, a Los 
Angeles newspaper The Herald described 
the Cuban insurgent as “the type of 
southern gentleman before the war- brave, 
courteous… proud of pure Spanish blood 
in their veins” and who was now growing 
“impatient of restraint, to gain the fullest 
freedom.”43 After the intervention, Cuban 
insurgents were described by U.S. military 
officers as “turbulent and illiterate negroes 
needing the government of a stronger 
race.”44 The well-known Afro-Cuban 
insurgent leader, Antonio Maceo, was 
described by The Herald as the “only one 
of the Cuban generals who had negro 
blood in his veins,” but emphasized 
that he was “well educated and quite a 
scholar.”45 A new narrative of the Cuban 
independence wars was needed to justify 
continued U.S. occupation of the island, 
one that highlighted Cubans’ inherent 
racial shortcomings. 
 
Figure 3:
(Library of Congress) 46 
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Before the U.S. intervention, Cubans were 
depicted as honorable (white) men, and 
after, as ungrateful blacks who needed 
better qualified men to govern the island. 
In part, this was because insurgents were 
much darker than the U.S. had anticipated 
the U.S. sought ways to minimize their 
role in the war. Their ragged appearance 
and their support for Cuba Libre justified 
the marginalization of the Liberation 
Army’s rank and file (Afro-Cuban) soldiers. 
The prevalent belief was that blacks were 
uncivilized barbarians who should not 
participate in, much less govern, Cuba. 
For this reason, the U.S. troops prevented 
rebel soldiers from entering Santiago 
after the surrender of the city, since they 
could not be trusted not to attack whites 
or to “plunder” and “pillage” the city.47 
The army was accused of not “[appearing 
even capable of helping themselves when 
others try to help them” as well as of 
having a “native character” marked by 
“innate duplicity.”48 After the intervention, 
propaganda depicting Cuba as a white 
woman begging Uncle Sam to rescue her 
from the “famine,” “war,” and “revolt” 
disappeared (Figure 3). Instead, U.S. 
newspapers began to emphasize how Cuba’s 
racial composition made it suitable for 
political independence.
Intervention was justified in terms of 
ensuring the triumph of Cuba Libre, 
whereas before it had been necessary as a 
way to stop the Spanish from oppressing 
Cubans. In this context, the U.S. 
occupation “became a selfless service for the 
cause of humanity,” and Cuban insurgents 
should be grateful of the sacrifices made 
by the U.S. forces to liberate them.49 
Insurgent leaders received the occupation 
forces with “distrust and doubt” rather 
than the enthusiasm Americans had 
expected.50 Stephen Crane remarked 
“The American soldier thinks of himself 
as a disinterested benefactor…he does 
not want to be thanked, and yet the total 
absence of anything like gratitude makes 
him furious.”51 Cubans were portrayed as 
“shirkers and slackers” and the rebels as 
ungrateful for the help provided in securing 
independence, which Cubans had been 
unable to achieve on their own.52 The 
liberation movement was accused of “being 
possessed but with one idea- the idea that 
we [Americans] had come to Cuba to free 
them and to feed them. They had therefore, 
nothing else to do.”53 American soldiers 
asserted that a minority of rebel soldiers 
fought valiantly alongside the U.S. troops 
but that most Cuban insurgents “[did] as 
little fighting as they could.”54 The idea that 
the U.S. had liberated Cuba was further 
proof that Americans should take control 
of the island. After all, to the victor belong 
the spoils. 
 
Figure 4: 
(Library of Congress) 55
Cuba’s racial dynamics became a 
determining factor in the island’s 
independence, since the U.S. perceived 
Cubans to be unable to protect U.S. 
interests. Afro-Cubans could not be trusted 
to govern the nation and protect U.S. 
interests, thus Cuba’s sovereignty was not 
recognized by the U.S. administration 
after the Second War of Independence.56 
The U.S. first needed to pacify the island 
and second assure that the right Cubans 
were elected into office before they would 
leave. Cuba required saving not only from 
“Spanish misrule” but also from anarchy 
(Figure 4). This idea that Cuba needed 
protection from herself, particularly from 
its black population, from Spanish tyranny, 
and from bad government guided U.S. 
policies on the island. American authorities 
hoped to promote a political atmosphere 
in which real Cubans (white elite pro-
American Cubans) would take leading 
roles in the new republic.57 According to 
Governor General Leonard Wood, “only 
the ‘ignorant masses,’ the ‘unruly rabble,’ 
and ‘trouble makers,’” advocated for 
independence and opposed intervention.58 
Real Cubans had not articulated their 
visions for the Cuban nation; when they 
did so, they would support American 
annexation.59 The U.S. concluded that it 
was their duty to restrain the masses from 
participating in the government, ensuring 
that “real Cubans” could implement their 
vision for the nation.
U.S. officials supported white Cubans’ 
position at the apex of the political 
hierarchy, which gave elite Cubans access 
to the structures of power. At the same 
time, the independence wars resulted in 
economic ruin for many planters in  Cuba. 
The economic and political standing of 
many Cubans was in the hands of U.S. 
officials and Cubans of the “better classes” 
were in no position to advocate for Afro-
Cuban interests.60 U.S. policies benefited 
Cuban elites politically and economically; 
therefore, elite Cubans who may have 
advocated for Afro-Cubans’ interests did 
not do so. It was not in the best interest 
for white Cubans to support Afro-Cubans’ 
demands for racial equality or to support 
the ideals of the raceless nation.61 
Undermining the Raceless Nation 
The independence wars did not culminate 
in an “independent, socially egalitarian, and 
racially inclusive” Cuba as many Cubans 
had hoped.62 Instead, members of the 
Liberation Army were dismissed with only 
seventy-five pesos to travel back to their 
homes, and whites who had supported 
the Spanish government continued to 
be employed in the same positions they 
had occupied prior to independence. 
After the war, some Afro-Cubans accused 
white elites of “[taking] over the business, 
factories, and public jobs, that [blacks] had 
just brought to independence.”63 Afro-
Cubans insinuated that they had the right 
to these positons because they had taken 
arms in the name of racial equality. U.S. 
interests were also protected by giving 
property rights to foreigners.64 The military 
government implemented discriminatory 
policies targeting Afro-Cubans at a time 
when they had the opportunity to attack 
the racial inequalities inherent in post-
independence Cuba.65 
The American occupation undermined the 
ideals of the raceless nation by favoring 
white Cubans in employment and politics. 
U.S. policies openly discriminated against 
Afro-Cubans, and the most prestigious 
jobs were closed to non-whites.66 For 
example, only 7 percent of jobs in central, 
provincial and municipal administrations 
were given to Afro-Cubans. Likewise, of 
the 8,238 policemen registered 21 percent 
were Afro-Cuban, of 5,964 teachers, 439 
were Afro-Cuban and of 205 government 
officials, 9 were Afro-Cuban.67  Blacks also 
faced discrimination by the adoption of 
suffrage laws requiring voters be literate, 
own property worth $250 or more, or have 
served in the Liberation Army. As a result, 
only 19 percent of Afro- Cuban males voted 
in 1901 despite making up 37 percent 
of the male citizens.68 Secretary of War 
Elihu Root explained that the suffrage laws 
were to exclude the “mass of ignorant and 
incompetent” so that a “conservative and 
thoughtful control of Cuba by Cubans” may 
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be promoted. Candidates running for the 
municipal elections that had been endorsed 
by the U.S. were not elected, which was 
seen as a demonstration of Cubans’ flawed 
judgement in that they could not be trusted 
to choose “the best men.”69 
Cuban cultural traditions were also under 
U.S. scrutiny during the intervention 
and occupation of the island. Cultural 
expressions, particularly Afro-Cuban 
traditions that appeared “barbaric 
or uncivilized” such as cockfighting 
or dancing el danzón, attested to the 
“characteristic” and “degenerate” nature of 
Afro-Cuban culture.71 Suppressing Cuban 
cultural practices that appeared backward 
were necessary so that the military 
government would deem that Cubans were 
educated, modern “citizens” who were also 
“deserving of their own government.”72 
This understanding of civilized behavior 
vilified Afro-Cuban cultural expressions. 
Cubans were depicted in newspapers as 
black children forced to abandon their 
uncivilized ways (Figure 5 shows how 
Americans imposed modernization through 
the forceful disinfecting of the nation). 
Those who engaged in these primitive 
behaviors risked showing the occupation 
forces that Cuba was not ready to take her 
place among other modern nations. Thus, 
Cuban elites utilized the U.S. fear of a 
separate Afro-Cuban movement to curb 
their demands for the implementation 
of the rights implicit in the ideals of the 
raceess nation.
 
Figure 5
(cited in Aline Helg, Our Rightful Share)70
Dissatisfaction was high among Afro-
Cubans, especially among those who 
had fought in the war. Participation 
in the liberation movement had given 
Afro-Cubans new expectations derived 
from the rhetoric of the raceless nation 
and Cuba Libre.73 The expectations were 
unrealized but Afro-Cubans were unwilling 
to demand their rights because to do so 
would result in accusations of undermining 
the ideals the raceless nation. There was 
little improvement in education or job 
opportunities for Afro-Cubans after 
independence. Only 26 percent of Afro- 
Cubans over the age of 10 could read in 
1899, as opposed to 44 percent of whites.74 
Some teachers prevented Afro-Cubans from 
entering their classrooms despite official 
integration of the educational system and 
universities did not allow black students 
to enroll.75 Darker-skinned Cubans lacked 
the educational foundation to participate 
in more prestigious or remunerative 
occupations. These inequalities were 
evident in that, for example, the same 
percent of Afro-Cuban women worked 
in low-skilled jobs such as laundresses, 
servants, peasants, and dressmakers in 1907 
as in 1899.76 Discontent increased amongst 
Afro-Cubans over the discrepancy between 
the claims of the raceless nation and 
reality. Cuban elites were oblivious to the 
plight of Afro-Cubans and used the U.S. 
occupation as a way to silence their protests 
against the inequalities that persisted after 
independence. Afro-Cubans who lost their 
jobs embraced the white-led rebellion that 
occurred as a result of the Moderate party’s 
antics in 1906.77 By September 1906, as 
many as 25,000 Afro-Cuban veterans had 
joined the Liberal’s movement, known 
as the August Revolution, in trying to 
overthrow the Moderate party from 
power.78 
The August Revolution prompted the 
second U.S. intervention (1906-1909). 
American journals and magazines portrayed 
blacks in the insurgency as a threat to 
the future of the nation. In 1906, the 
Minneapolis Journal declared that the 
rebellion was made up of men “whose 
trade is revolution. Stable government 
does not satisfy them” and therefore “the 
preservation of Cuban independence even 
if a temporary occupation of the island 
by American troops is necessary.”79 The 
Washington Times suggested that insurgency 
was unavoidable since “patriots denied 
there was any danger of a race question” 
but “secretly they realized an impending 
evil, an inexplicable danger from the black 
man.”80 It also warned that the “black 
man” entering the capital “in a startling 
military uniform of his own creation, 
lacking only the white plumes to give him 
the appearance of a Haitian general” was 
out to “overwhelm the pure white race.”81 
The specter of the threatening Afro-Cuban, 
and the prospect of a black republic was 
once again brought forth to instill fear in 
white Cubans. Moreover, the threat posed 
by Afro-Cubans also justified a second 
intervention, since the Platt Amendment 
gave the U.S. rights to intervene to protect 
U.S. property and businesses. To quiet the 
masses, the provisional government gave 
white veterans public jobs and General 
José Miguel Gómez promised that Afro-
Cubans would be favored if he were elected 
president.82
It was clear by 1906 that the Liberal 
party would not fulfil their promises to 
Afro-Cubans. The idea of a black party 
advocating for Afro-Cuban representation 
gained momentum by 1907, since Liberals 
had “betrayed” Afro-Cubans during 
the second intervention by failing to 
recommend blacks for public jobs as they 
had promised, and by telling U.S. officials 
that Afro-Cubans were “extreme radicals.”83 
Afro-Cubans turned their attention to 
gaining access to public jobs through the 
creation of a black political party. This 
resulted in Evaristo Estenoz and Gregorio 
Surín forming the Partido Independiente 
de Color, or Independent Party of Color 
(PIC) on August 7, 1908. Although the 
PIC demanded equal political rights for 
blacks and their integration into society, 
it also appealed to mulattos and a small 
segment of whites.84 In an effort to quell 
whites’ anxiety over black mobilization, 
Previsión, the party’s newspaper, addressed 
the most common fears − the creation 
of another Haiti, and the depiction of 
Afro-Cubans as uncivilized.85 Previsíon 
refuted the claims that Afro-Cubans were 
attempting to construct a black republic 
by highlighting the need for a black party. 
According to the party platform, blacks 
needed representation because Cuba was 
discriminating against blacks in the same 
way the United States did.86 The PIC 
asserted that political parties attempted to 
“[discredit] the black masses” by depicting 
Afro-Cubans as uncivilized in the eyes of 
the provisional government.87 They also 
insisted that Afro-Cuban stigmatization 
was meant to serve as encouragement 
for anti-black policies from the U.S. 
provisional government.88
Independientes (PIC supporters), promoted 
a positive Afro-Cuban racial consciousness 
by encouraging black pride. While this did 
not directly challenge the rhetoric of the 
raceless nation, it did encourage blacks to 
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celebrate cultural and political expressions 
that were exclusively Afro-Cuban.89 The 
PIC modified Martí’s raceless nation by 
going beyond the idea that the island 
was “for whites and blacks” and claiming 
that to be Cuban could also mean being 
black.90 Letters written to Previsión thanked 
Estenoz for creating a newspaper solely for 
Afro-Cubans, something that was “ours, 
without mixing or blending with foreign 
bodies,” while other letters claimed it was 
“time that you show what you are as a black 
and Cuban woman.”91 For these Afro-
Cubans, Cubanidad meant taking pride in 
being black and taking part in the republic 
as a Cuban citizen who had earned equal 
rights.
The PIC also renounced claims that Cuba 
had achieved racial equality after the 
wars of independence as a way to attract 
supporters and defend the party’s goals and 
demands. The Party’s newspaper challenged 
the depiction of the “typical” Cuban 
(represented by the cartoon character 
Liborio) by creating a black cartoon 
character (José Rosario) who refuted the 
claims of Liborio.92 José Rosario described 
how Liborio betrayed the pact the two 
had sworn when Liborio, out of fear of the 
other man, allied with the United States at 
the end of the war.93 The cartoon illustrated 
how white Cubans betrayed the promises 
made during the independence wars and 
how as a result racial equality did not exist 
after independence. Therefore, Afro-
Cubans had the right to mobilize and assert 
their interests through the PIC. 
Afro-Cuban participation in the August 
Revolution, combined with the PIC 
demands for equal rights for Afro-Cubans 
threatened the political equilibrium on 
the island. Cuban elites responded to this 
danger by adopting a series of measures 
to undermine Afro-Cuban mobilization, 
which included labeling the PIC a racist 
movement.94 They spread rumors that 
the Partido Independiente de Color was 
anti-white, anti-Cuban, and unpatriotic 
as a way to undermine the party.95 The 
PIC was a threat to the ideals of the 
raceless nation because it advocated for the 
interest of a single racial group. A Cuban 
pamphlet described the August Revolution 
as having been started by the “butchers 
of Africa” who hoped to take revenge on 
whites.96 Afro-Cubans were accused in The 
Washington Post of “[looking] upon the 
white man as his natural enemy.97 Based on 
these accusations the Liberal party drafted a 
proposal in congress to disband the PIC on 
the grounds that it was racist. The Morúa 
Amendment argued that the PIC promoted 
the interests of Afro-Cubans and that it 
marginalized whites. Nonetheless, Estenoz 
continued to refute allegations by claiming 
to be driven by “concern for peace and 
equality” for all Cubans.98 
The Cuban government accused PIC 
members of organizing against whites in an 
effort to disband the party and to weaken 
their support. Yet, no substantial proof 
was presented in the trials of PIC members 
in 1910 and the witnesses questioned did 
not admit to hearing any conspiracies  
against white Cubans.99 The threat of black 
mobilization led by the PIC served several 
purposes, one of which was to create alarm 
in Washington and subsequently prompt 
another U.S. intervention.100 Some Cubans 
privately complained to U.S. officials 
about the ineffectiveness of the Cuban 
government and warned of possible threats 
to U.S. interests on the island.101 Such 
threats to American property obligated the 
Cuban government to take action or risk 
another intervention.102 
Cuban newspapers played a crucial role in 
how the PIC was perceived by other Cubans 
and the United States. Panic spread across 
the island in 1910 as newspapers depicted 
rural towns and white women as susceptible 
to “warlike mobilization” by both the PIC 
and Afro-Cubans.103 Newspapers printed 
stories in which dangerous blacks roamed 
the countryside targeting whites, much 
like the Spanish had depicted the black 
rebel insurgents during the Ten Years’ War. 
By 1912, headlines such as “The Racist 
Revolution” and the “Racist Uprising” 
were being printed by major newspapers 
on the island.104 This state of panic gave the 
government the opportunity to mobilize 
popular opinion against the Partido 
Independiente de Color and to discredit 
Afro-Cuban demands for positions in the 
government. The government targeted the 
party and used racial stereotypes to instill 
greater fear in the population, expediting 
whites’ fear of a black-led rebellion.105 At 
the same time, U.S. newspapers warned 
that “Cuba [was] still on trial before the 
world…If it convicts itself of incapacity for 
self-rule once more and compels against its 
fate hereafter should independence be finally 
be taken away from it.”106 The exaggerated 
stories printed by the press swayed public 
opinion against the PIC , whereas in the 
U.S. the PIC and claims of a race war were 
tantamount to Cuba’s inability to maintain 
a stable government without foreign 
intervention. 
The Cuban government adopted a three-
step strategy to undermine the PIC 
and Afro-Cuban demands for greater 
political participation. The provincial 
governors in Cuba were directed to 
question independientes partaking in any 
“unusual movements.”107 In April 1912, 
the government dispatched troops to Santa 
Clara and Oriente because these provinces 
were allegedly at higher risk of rebellion.108 
Afro-Cubans suspected of being PIC 
members were arrested at the end of April 
and beginning of May.109 These actions 
gave credence to the rumors circulating 
of blacks attacking whites and heightened 
whites’ fears. Meanwhile, newspapers 
claimed that Cuba was becoming a black 
nation.
The party remained outlawed despite 
independientes’ efforts to revoke the Morúa 
Amendment in time for the November 
1912 elections.110 Independientes warned 
that they would take action if the Cuban 
Congress or the United States did not 
recognize the PIC by April 22, 1912.111 
In the last weeks of May, PIC supporters 
threatened foreign interests on the island, 
and on May 31 and June 1 they protested 
by burning buildings.112 Newspapers 
claimed independientes’ actions were part 
of a race war allegedly carried out by the 
PIC. According to the Cuban newspaper 
El Dia, it was “an uprising of blacks, in 
other words, an enormous danger and a 
common danger” that would result in “the 
free and beautiful America defending herself 
against a clawing scratch from Africa.”113 The 
protest preyed upon preconceived racial 
fears of blacks as barbarians whose goal 
was to control the island. Fear of another 
Haitian Revolution, this time in Cuba, 
also gave credence to claims that the PIC’s 
armed protest was in fact a race war.114 
Some American newspapers even claimed 
that Haitians and Jamaicans were active 
participants in the armed protest, basing 
their allegations on the foreign sounding 
names of some PIC leaders.115 Newspapers 
in the U.S. described Evaristo Estenoz as 
“the same vainglorious negro” who had 
led the earlier insurrection and whose 
followers were “extorting tribute from 
peaceful merchants and traders.”116 The 
PIC was denounced as racist by Cuban and 
American newspapers for taking action and 
demanding that the ideals of the raceless 
nation be implemented. 
Many of the troops dispatched to Oriente 
in response to the fear spreading across 
the island were white.117 The Cuban 
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government encouraged the formation 
of voluntary militias (voluntarios), who 
along with the Army, persecuted Afro-
Cubans in Oriente, and often “[did not] 
respect at all the people of color and 
threaten them insolently without thinking 
of the serious conflict that their behavior 
could produce.”118 Afro-Cubans with no 
affiliation to the PIC were targeted because 
of their skin color when voluntarios, the 
Cuban army, and U.S. officials did not 
distinguish between Afro-Cubans and 
independientes.119 Such an incident occurred 
in May 31 when General Carlos Mendieta 
attacked a group of Afro-Cubans living in 
La Maya, killing 150 Cuban peasants with 
no ties to the PIC.120 Independientes burned 
houses, the post office and the railway 
station in La Maya in reprisal.121 Rumors 
spread that PIC supporters had burned 
down the entire area and repression against 
all blacks increased.122 
Rumors of black mobilization and the 
possibility that Afro-Cubans might attack 
U.S. property reached the American 
government in June.123 Approximately 
1,000 Marines were sent to protect U.S. 
property and mines, and three more 
warships joined the three ships already 
anchored in Santiago and Guantánamo to 
protect railroads and foreign property.124 
The presence of U.S. military personnel 
contributed to the violence that spread 
across the region by allowing voluntarios 
and the Army to focus on repressing the 
PIC members, rather than protecting U.S. 
lives and property.125 It also pressured the 
Cuban government to take additional 
measures asserting control of the situation. 
This was necessary to ensure another 
intervention would not occur. Greater 
repression against Afro-Cubans was 
justified because of the perceived threat to 
U.S. lives and property.”126 A New York 
newspaper, The Sun, for example, stated 
“if the young republic does not rapidly 
put down the negro insurrection… and 
demonstrates that the lives and property 
of Americans and other foreigners are safe 
throughout the island, Uncle Sam will do 
it for her.”127 The possibility of Afro-Cuban 
mobilization justified the U.S. involvement 
and served as an opportunity for the Cuban 
government to eliminate the PIC.
Newspapers in the U.S. had assured readers 
that no intervention was forthcoming 
“unless a state of anarchy is threatened” 
on the island.128 By June, rumors of blacks 
threatening property and “sugar mills…
flaming in eastern Cuba” ran rampant in 
the U.S. and Cuba.129 Yet, some newspapers 
warned that many of the stories in the 
Cuban press were over-exaggerated. The 
Nation denied that the uprising was racially 
motivated, instead affirming that it was 
“mainly political, the negroes desiring to 
form a party of their own, and to run an 
independent candidate for the presidency.” 
Blacks were “persuaded” to protest because 
they have “not been sufficiently considered 
in the distribution of offices.”130 The 
newspaper also informed readers that the 
uprising was led by Haitian and Jamaican 
immigrant workers taking advantage of 
labor shortages on the island.131
Military personnel in Cuba believed 
all Afro-Cubans to be potential PIC 
supporters.132 For this reason, Afro-Cubans 
were treated without mercy regardless of 
whether there was proof of their affiliations 
with independientes.133 The U.S. consul 
admitted that in Santiago “many innocent 
and defenseless negroes in the country 
[were] being butchered.”134 Moreover, 
the French consul accused voluntarios 
and the Cuban army of arbitrarily killing 
blacks not because they were suspects 
but because “they want a war. They want 
targets,” and they will massacre “poor very 
peaceful wretches whose only crime will 
be not being born white.”135 Newspapers 
described corpses being left in the open 
and rebels being “bound hand and foot 
and tied together with a big rope” before 
being taken by the police.136 In response to 
the brutality, PIC supporters attempted to 
garner U.S. support by contacting officials 
and denouncing the slaughter of innocent 
Afro-Cubans. For example, Evaristo 
Estenoz demanded that the U.S. send 
representatives to the region who could 
directly report the atrocities committed by 
the Cuban army against innocent people 
of color.137 His message was ignored by the 
U.S., despite the protection of “property, 
life and liberty” guaranteed by the Platt 
Amendment. 
The Cuban government augmented the 
fear of blacks and slaughtered innocent 
Afro- Cubans. The New York Times stated 
that on July 2, 1912 a “special cable” was 
sent to the newspaper assuring Americans 
that “the negro uprising [was] definitely 
put down” and guaranteeing that the rural 
guards and guerillas would continue to seek 
insurgents until the “last rebel hiding in the 
mountains was either captured or killed.”138 
Any Afro-Cuban could be accused of 
being a “rebel” because it was difficult to 
distinguish between PIC members and 
innocent Afro-Cubans. Leaders of the 
rebellion, amongst them Estenoz, and 
Pedro Ivonnet, were killed for allegedly 
attempting to escape arrest.139 Other blacks 
were accused of “conspiring against the 
republic” and were transported to Havana 
for trial.140 Approximately 5,000 to 6,000 
rebels were killed in 1912, although reliable 
numbers are not available. In contrast, a 
total of 16 members of the Cuban armed 
forces were killed.141 Thousands of Afro-
Cubans were murdered during the 1912 
Race War for claiming the rights they were 
entitled to in the raceless nation. 
Most people on the island were aware of 
the atrocities committed against Afro-
Cubans in 1912, yet did nothing to stop 
innocent blacks from being targeted.142 
For many Cubans, the indiscriminate 
killings and repression against blacks were 
far removed events that did not affect 
their everyday life. Some U.S. citizens 
living in Cuba were not only aware of 
the repression, but also approved of the 
repressive tactics used. A U.S. citizen 
in Oriente declared that “the army and 
the volunteers have lopped the heads of 
probably some six thousand negroes in the 
province and the rest as whole have had 
the fear of God drilled into their souls. 
I believe the remedy was necessary and 
effective.”143 While another admitted that 
“some innocent heads may have fallen, in 
the main there have been few sacrificed 
at a loss to the country-and the effect has 
been salutary.”144 Newspapers criticized the 
Cuban government’s use of the rebellion to 
further political goals, but none objected to 
the massacre of Afro-Cubans.145
The U.S. administration also received 
reports from the consul in Santiago 
describing the events that occurred in the 
region. Descriptions of the “race war” sent 
by the U.S. consul communicated that 
Afro-Cubans were being targeted because 
of their skin color and not because 
they were mobilizing against whites.146 
The problem of the independientes was 
best solved by the death of PIC leaders 
and their supporters, despite the U.S. 
consul acknowledging that PIC goals 
were not to “take up arms against the 
government” but “to secure a redress 
of their grievances or repeal of the 
Morúa Law through concerted action 
in demonstration of revolutionary 
character.”147 The Day Book commented 
in regard to the 1912 rebellion that 
“Cuba’s got to be a conservative republic 
even if we have to shoot her full of radial 
holes.”148 Newspapers and magazines in 
the U.S. and Cuba openly discussed the 
atrocities committed against Afro-Cubans 
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establishing that the U.S. government was 
aware of the repression occurring in the 
island.
Cubans had come together to fight for a 
raceless nation, but were divided by the 
policies implemented after independence. 
The U.S. occupation and intervention 
failed to bring about the implementation 
of Cuba Libre. Afro-Cubans, acting 
upon the rights presumably they had 
earned during the liberation movement, 
protested their lack of political rights. 
Having risen up in armed rebellion, they 
made themselves vulnerable to racial 
accusations. The fear of blacks attacking 
whites was augmented by political pressure 
from the U.S, who threatened another 
intervention to ensure the protection of 
foreign property. White Cubans, urged 
by self-interest, further increased fear of 
blacks in 1912 to justify the repression of 
a black-only political party. This allowed 
them to eliminate political competition 
and to undermine Afro-Cuban demands 
to positions of power. 
Racial Inequality and the U.S. 
Intervention 
The elite eastern planters who led the 
Ten Years’ War in 1868 promised slaves 
equality and insinuated that they would 
be emancipated if they took up arms in 
support of a free Cuba. Afro-Cubans who 
fought in the Ten Years’ War adopted the 
claim that Cubans were equal, regardless 
of race, to demand emancipation as 
one of the movement’s goals. Although 
vaguely promised, the prospect of eventual 
emancipation drew large numbers of Afro-
Cubans into the Liberation Army, giving 
rise to the perception that the insurgency 
was predominantly black. Anxiety over 
blacks taking part in an armed protest, 
particularly in western regions of the island 
where a large percent of the work force was 
enslaved, spread amongst white Cubans. 
The Spanish government was able to utilize 
the fear of a black republic and the threat 
posed by Afro-Cubans to undermine 
the rebels’ objectives. Division amongst 
black and white insurgents resulted in 
negotiations with Spain in 1878 to end 
the war, but Afro-Cubans in the eastern 
regions continued to fight for Cuba Libre. 
Dissatisfied patriots from the Ten Years’ 
War also led a new rebellion in 1879. 
Afro-Cuban participation in the Guerra 
Chiquita surpassed that of whites, since 
many white veterans failed to support the 
Little War. Therefore, the insurgency was 
blacker than the Ten Years’ War, which 
allowed the Spanish government to portray 
it as a threat to Cuban society and to the 
entire nation. This made it possible for 
the Spanish government to suppress the 
insurgency in less than a year. 
Independence leaders fashioned a 
new image for black insurgents prior 
to the outbreak of the Second War of 
Independence in 1895. Afro-Cubans were 
portrayed as submissive and beholden to 
whites for granting them their freedom. 
In formulating the concept of the raceless 
nation, Cuban independence leaders were 
counteracting the racial tensions exploited 
by the Spanish government in the Ten 
Years’ War by reassuring white Cubans 
that blacks posed no threat. According 
to José Martí, racial integration had been 
achieved in the Ten Years’ War when blacks 
and whites, fighting together, had died 
for Cuban independence. By 1898, many 
sectors of society supported the ideal that 
Cubans, regardless of their racial or social 
class, could cooperate with one another to 
create a nation free of foreign influence and 
racial injustice. 
 This rhetoric alarmed the U.S. and 
the Cuban planter class because the 
implementation of Cuba Libre threatened 
Cuban elites as well as U.S. hegemony. 
Therefore, the United States followed the 
near triumph of the liberation movement 
in Cuba with alarm. Spain’s inability to 
control the insurgency, her refusal to 
allow the U.S. to purchase Cuba, and 
the imminent triumph of Cuba Libre 
left the U.S. administration with two 
choices: intervention or independence. 
However, American involvement needed 
to be justified. Intervention was deemed 
necessary so that Americans could aid the 
unjustly oppressed (white) Cubans. 
The racial composition of the Liberation 
Army was not what the U.S. forces 
had expected. American soldiers were 
confronted by ragged Afro-Cuban 
insurgents, rather than the army of 
white Cubans they had imagined. Afro-
Cubans were deemed incapable or unable 
of governing an independent Cuba, 
necessitating the construction of a new 
narrative – the ungrateful and incompetent 
Cuban soldier incapable of achieving 
independence without outside assistance. 
Cubans were no longer depicted as heroic 
men and women, but as lazy blacks devoid 
of honor and incapable of self-government. 
Their racial identity was linked to American 
preconceptions of African-Americans. The 
racialized portrayal of Cubans allowed 
the U.S. administration to discredit the 
independence movement since a large 
proportion of the rebels were black. Afro-
Cuban rebels would not be allowed to take 
control of the island and Cubans, who were 
backwards, uncivilized and whose blood 
was intermixed with blacks, needed U.S. 
help in governing the nation.
Policies implemented by the U.S. military 
government assisted white Cubans in 
securing political power and ensured 
that Afro-Cubans were denied positions 
of power. Suffrage laws, Afro-Cuban 
cultural repression, and U.S. endorsement 
of white Cubans safeguarded the social 
hierarchy the raceless nation claimed 
to have been fighting against. Afro-
Cuban cultural traditions, deemed too 
uncivilized for modern times, were also 
dismissed as unpatriotic. The Second 
War of Independence did not culminate 
in a nation free from racial segregation 
or foreign interest. Instead, racial 
inequalities persisted in educational and job 
opportunities. Frustrations increased at the 
lack of opportunities for Afro-Cubans who 
had fought in the liberation movement, yet 
had earned few rights after independence. 
In 1905, Afro-Cubans joined whites in the 
August Revolution, protesting the loss of 
public jobs and political power at the hand 
of the Moderate party. This new insurgency 
triggered the second U.S. intervention 
from 1906 to 1909. U.S newspapers 
described the revolution as a race war and 
Afro-Cubans as threats to the island. Once 
again, blacks were depicted as a menace to 
the nation and as standing in the way of 
progress. 
It was clear by 1905 that Afro-Cubans 
would not be awarded the rights the 
independence movement claimed they 
had achieved, despite claims asserting 
otherwise. Therefore, they formed the 
Partido Independiente de Color (PIC) 
as a way to organize and demanded 
improved educational opportunities for 
Afro-Cubans and better access to jobs in 
the government - rights the raceless nation 
declared they had earned. Rumors spread 
across the island that the movement was 
racist and unpatriotic since it attempted to 
divide Cubans by skin color. Newspapers 
accused PIC supporters of mobilizing 
against whites, and the Cuban government 
outlawed the party on the basis that it was 
racist. The party remained outlawed despite 
independientes’ efforts to revoke the Morúa 
Law. As a result, PIC supporters gave the 
Cuban government until April 22, 1912 
to allow the PIC to participate in politics 
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on the island. Independientes threatened 
U.S. interests in Cuba and burned several 
buildings when their ultimatum was 
ignored, which led to newspapers accusing 
blacks of commencing a race war targeting 
whites. The Cuban government, acting 
upon the fear of black insurgents running 
through the countryside assaulting whites, 
dispatched troops to Oriente. Violence 
against blacks escalated from then on, since 
the Cuban army and voluntarios treated all 
Afro-Cubans as potential PIC supporters. 
Rumors and allegations of blacks targeting 
foreign property reached the U.S. in 
June, resulting in the dispatch of the 
Marines to ensure American economic 
interests were protected. The presence of 
American forces in Cuba pressured the 
Cuban administration to take more drastic 
measures. For this reason, the repression 
of the Afro-Cuban revolt was crucial to 
expedite the U.S. departure from the 
island. Intervention and the threat of a 
third occupation triggered even more 
repression towards Afro-Cubans. What 
commenced as the Liberal party’s plan to 
impede blacks from participating in Cuban 
politics culminated in U.S. involvement. 
The repression against Afro-Cubans and 
the allegations against blacks, which were 
manipulated by the Cuban authorities to 
undermine the PIC’s claim to positions 
of power, concerned Americans. Thus, 
the suppression of Afro-Cuban demands 
acquired new meaning during 1912 since 
Cuba now had to assure Americans that it 
could effectively repress the rebellion.
Afro-Cubans were killed as American 
military personnel stood by protecting U.S. 
interests. U.S. officials were aware of the 
indiscriminate killings of Afro-Cubans, but 
they concluded that the simplest method 
of resolving the political and social tensions 
was to allow events to run their course. 
Therefore, the U.S. did not condemn the 
brutal massacre of approximately 5,000 
to 6,000 Afro-Cubans. Blacks could 
not criticize the death of Afro-Cubans 
for fear that they too would be targeted 
because they had little political support 
from the government and were excluded 
from positions of power. When Afro-
Cubans protested their lack of rights, 
they were depicted as unpatriotic. Cuban 
elites had government support as well as 
foreign aid, allowing them to subdue the 
black insurgency they claimed threatened 
Cubans. At the same time, white Cubans’ 
access to power was protected by U.S. 
support. Elite whites ensured darker-skin 
Cubans remained subjugated both by 
accusing them of racial discrimination 
and by depicting blacks as a threat to the 
raceless nation. 
The United States intervention provided 
elite Cubans with the opportunity to 
undermine the ideals of the raceless nation 
and Cuba Libre by adopting U.S. racial 
rhetoric to marginalize Afro-Cubans. White 
Cubans could argue that Afro-Cubans 
should silence their demands for the sake of 
not extending the U.S. intervention. They 
also prevented Afro-Cubans and lower-class 
Cubans from taking positions of power 
as a way to forestall the implementation 
of Martí’s vision for Cuba. Anyone who 
subscribed to the notion of the raceless 
nation was a potential threat to U.S. 
interests and the elite planter class. For this 
reason, Afro-Cubans were marginalized and 
their demands for equality undermined. 
The U.S. intervention provided Cuban 
elites with the opportunity to solidify 
their position at the top of the political 
hierarchy. Black marginalization 
contributed to the claim that Cubans were 
not worthy of independence because they 
had not fought to liberate their own nation. 
Afro-Cubans had sacrificed little for their 
nation, so it was not their place to demand 
rights. Rather, U.S. forces alone had fought 
and died to give Cuba its independence. 
This justified the United States’ efforts to 
undermine the ideals of the raceless nation 
and Cuba Libre; after all, to the victor 
belong the spoils.
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